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Abstract: This study examines how military counter-terrorism (CT) measures affect the 
quality of democracy by altering civil-military relations (CMR) and focuses on civil-
military relations as the main causal mechanism. We argue that the use of a military 
approach in counter-terrorism jeopardizes democracy at the societal level by increasing 
the belief that only the military is equipped to deal with the threat at hand. Therefore, 
erosions of civil liberties are tolerated in exchange for security.  Second, we argue that 
military CT measures change the balance between the military and executive powers in 
procedural and liberal democracies. While the military’s executive power increases in 
procedural democracies, the civilian ruler’s control of the military power increases in 
liberal ones.  Case studies of the U.S. and Turkey show that a military counter-terrorism 
approach affects CMR in these countries, which generate a similar tradeoff between 
security and the quality of democracy, albeit via different causal mechanisms.  While that 
tradeoff is less severe in the U.S., Turkey is more vulnerable to erosion of democracy.  
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Introduction  
This study examines how military counterterrorism (CT) measures affect the quality of 
democracy by altering civil-military relations (CMR). While studies exploring the 
relationship between democracy and terrorism are many,0F1 scholarship on how 
counterterrorism affects democracy is limited.1F2 Moreover, the causal mechanisms that 
establish how counterterrorism response influences democracy are understudied. We 
specifically focus on civil-military relations as the main causal mechanism to fill this gap 
in the literature.  
This is an important line of inquiry for several reasons. First, CMR has seldom 
been studied in the context of counterterrorism.2F3 Second, scholars have examined various 
approaches to counterterrorism,3F4 including the factors that shape these approaches and 
the decision-making processes behind them.4F5 However, the role of CMR as the main 
causal mechanism linking military counterterrorism measures to the quality of democracy 
has been overlooked. Third, we separate how CMR develop in different types of 
democracies in the context of counterterrorism. Finally, we distinguish our work from 
others by employing Przeworski and Teune’s most-different systems design5F6 using the 
cases of Turkey (procedural democracy) and the U.S. (liberal democracy) to illustrate our 
argument. A procedural democracy is based on principles of delegation and majority 
votes,6F7 whereas a liberal democracy is based not only on principles of delegation and 
majority votes, but also political freedoms and civil liberties for all individuals.7F8 
A democratic regime comprises “institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” 
constitutes “institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and 
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guarantees “civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation.”8 F9 Our emphasis is on civil liberties and executive power, as liberal 
democracy prioritizes protection of civil liberties and constraints on executive power.  
Terrorism is “acts of political violence against mainly civilians and non-
combatants with the intention to impact the perceptions of various audiences.”9F10 Military 
CT measures are among the various strategies available to decision-makers, and they 
refer to the use of the military and non-military security providers, such as intelligence 
and law enforcement, to employ offensive and defensive measures to neutralize the 
terrorist organization’s violence. Finally, CMR in a democracy are the interactions 
between the military elite that is responsible for protecting the society, the political elite 
in charge of national security policy, and the society that vests its security in the hands of 
the military and the political elite.10F11  
We build on the literature that suggests terrorist threats invoke the securitization 
of terrorism, which means policymakers identify terrorism as a significant security threat 
requiring emergency measures.11F12 In other words, by framing terrorism as a security threat 
to internal and international security, political elites justify using extraordinary measures 
to counter or eliminate terrorist threats. Therefore, the securitization of terrorism often 
leads to military CT approaches, which are associated with the “use of excessive 
force.”12F13  
Our question is: in what ways does military CT measures affect democracy after 
terrorism has already been securitized and the government has opted to implement a 
military CT response? We argue that the use of a military approach in CT jeopardizes 
democracy, i.e. civil liberties, by increasing the societal belief that only the military is 
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equipped to offset the threat. We then focus on CMR to explain how military CT 
measures change the balance between the military and civilian executive powers in 
procedural and liberal democracies. We start out with the normative assumption that 
civilian political control over the military is preferable to military control of the state13F14 
and we utilize two cases that have different levels of civilian control over the military. 
The first one is Turkey, where civilian control over the military has been limited as most 
immediately demonstrated by frequent military coups and interventions since the 1960s, 
and therefore, does not adhere closely to our normative assumption. Our second case, 
which adheres more closely to the normative assumption is the U.S., where civilians are 
in control of the military. The analysis of the U.S. and Turkey shows that military 
counterterrorism measures foster CMR, albeit in diverse ways, generating a tradeoff 
between security and the quality of democracy.  While that tradeoff is less severe in the 
U.S., Turkey is more vulnerable.  
 
Military Counterterrorism Measures and Quality of Democracy 
Various factors alter the quality of democracy. Lipset highlights the importance of 
economic development and a market economy among other variables.14F15 Dahl points to 
the effects of institutional choices and designs i.e. the electoral system on democracy.15F16 
Liphart argues, “consensus democracy makes a big difference with regard to almost all 
the indicators of democratic quality and regard to almost all of the kinder, gentler 
qualities.”16F17 Putnam’s seminal work shows that social capital, specifically networks of 
civic engagement such as neighborhood associations and choral societies, are deemed key 
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to making democracy work,17F18 while Inglehart suggests that belief in the legitimacy of 
democracy and behavioral commitment are necessary for democratic stability.18F19          
We suggest that the quality of democracy will alter once democracies employ military 
measures in counterterrorism since, as Crelinsten argues, war models of CT lead to an 
excessive use of force.19F20 Terrorist attacks often shock governments. Several 
counterterrorism options are available to a government, including criminal justice, 
military or reconciliatory CT approaches. Governments typically utilize a combination of 
these approaches.20F21 The scope of this study, however, is limited to the effects of a 
military CT response, on the quality of democracy. The relevance of examining the 
consequences of the military CT response is evident in the increasing trend starting from 
the 1970s in Western democracies.21F22  
The negative effects of military CT measures on democracy, however, is not a 
foregone conclusion. In other words, democracy does not necessarily suffer in countries 
that use military CT responses, particularly if the bulk of the operations are conducted 
overseas. For example, the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013 against 
global jihadists did not have consequences on democratic practices in France. The crisis 
in Mali was framed as a threat to national security. Consequently, cuts to military 
spending in France were minimized.  The collapse of Mali would have significantly 
threatened France’s political as well as economic interests in the region. 22F23 While French 
intervention in the name of the war on terrorism in Mali was, in many ways, similar to 
U.S. operations in Iraq, French democracy has not suffered the way American democracy 
has, as demonstrated below.  
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A military CT response influences democracy in several ways. 23F24 Crelinsten and 
Schmid argue that as the legitimacy of the terrorist organization and its grievances 
increase due to the use of force by the state, the legitimacy of the democratic government 
declines.24F25 Crelinsten also highlights the “delicate trust that exists within a democracy, 
between a government and its electorate” and suggests that military CT measures hurt 
democracies.25F26 Moreover, there may be a tradeoff between the effectiveness of CT 
measures and their democratic acceptability.26F27 As governments resort increasingly to 
military responses in countering terrorism and propagate for use of force, citizens’ 
willingness to accept harsh measures surges. Alternatively, Dunlop shows that once the 
military overtakes security responsibilities that should be performed by the police, public 
trust in the ability of the police force and the democratic government to keep it safe 
deteriorates.27F28 Military responses to terrorism also instigate fear and an increase in 
societal threat perception, which curbs the initiative of civil society to mobilize and 
participate in democratic governance.28F29 Finally, de Goede emphasizes how governments 
introduce preemptive measures in the fight against terrorism and how these measures can 
introduce undemocratic practices that are based on speculation or fear. After the 9/11 
attacks, for example, the security and financial sectors worked together to stop the 
resource flow to terrorist organizations by freezing the assets of Muslim charity 
organizations.29F30 
While these studies enhance our understanding of the relationship between 
military CT and the quality of democracy, we argue that CMR have been overlooked in 
the context of counterterrorism and democracy.30F31 We discuss how and why civilian- 
military balance is affected by a military approach to CT in democracies below.  
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The Causal Mechanism: Civil-Military Relations  
CMR entail the interaction of three major actors: military, political elite and the society.31F32 
CMR involves the direct and indirect interactions between these three main actors over 
funding, regulations, the use of the military, as well as the complex bargaining between 
civilian and military elites to delineate and implement national security policy.32F33  
Moreover, in the context of  terrorist attacks, the military and the political elite focus on 
preempting  future attacks, adding one more layer of complexity to CMR.33F34  We argue 
that military CT measures trigger two sets of processes; at the societal decision-maker 
levels. These processes are closely linked and can occur simultaneously, although 
interactions at the societal level are more likely to precede the decision-making process.  
 Terrorist attacks on the homeland are powerful shocks. A successful attack 
debilitates the government and instills fear in the society. Thus, at the societal level, a 
military CT response to credible and consistent terrorist threats signals to the public that 
the country is in war. Wars often create a rally-around-the-flag effect, which draws the 
military and society closer. If the military is effective in the fight against terrorism, the 
society’s trust in the armed forces will increase. By targeting civilians, terrorism induces 
such a sense of collective insecurity that it suggests only the military can efficiently 
respond to the challenge. Consequently, militarism, which refers to “the belief in military 
deterrence or the reliance on military strength to defend one’s nation and its values,”34F35 
legitimizes the use of force in exchange for democratic practices. For example, public 
support for civil liberties declined and draconian counterterrorism measures were 
legitimized in the U.K. over a twenty-year period following the start of IRA terrorism.35F36 
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Once popular support for civil liberties and freedoms decrease in exchange for security, 
public opinion ceases to limit government’s ability to violate civil liberties. While other 
constraints, such as a constitutional framework, a free press, and independent judiciary 
might still curb a government’s aptitude to move strongly in an anti-democratic direction, 
the removal of the public opinion constraint on civil liberties is likely to have a negative 
effect on the quality of democracy.36F37  Therefore, as Figure 1 shows, we hypothesize that 
the use of military measures in counterterrorism decreases democracy i.e. civil liberties 
and freedoms (H1). 
 
/Figure 1 about here/ 
 
 At the decision-maker level, on the other hand, constant bargaining for the 
allocation and use of resources ensues between the political elite and the military. The 
armed forces in democracies are kept under control through various mechanisms such as 
punishment (dismissal, courts etc.) or active use of the media as a monitoring 
mechanism.37F38 When a credible terrorist threat is countered using military force, a state’s 
limited resources become a chip on the bargaining table. The political elite must decide 
how much the defense sector requires to provide security against terrorism, granting it an 
increased defense budget and manpower, which results in a process of militarization, or 
the “the accumulation of capacity for organized violence, to a ‘military build-up.’”38F39  
During militarization, governments typically escalate the use of military force; 
either convinced that the threat is truly credible or seizing upon the crisis as an 
opportunity to augment political power, popularity or survival. Thus, military 
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expenditures and the number of troops deployed in conflict areas surge and the military’s 
influence permeates politics.  
Overall, while a militaristic culture institutionalized through militarization is the 
expected consequence of military counterterrorism measures, the nature and degree of 
their effect depends on the maturity of the democracy. Consequently, we expect CMR to 
play out differently in procedural democracies than in liberal ones even though the 
eventual outcome is the same: decline in the quality of democracy.  
In both types of democracies, the military obeys civilians only because CMR is 
institutionalized within a strict regime of principles, norms and laws.39F40 However, in 
procedural democracies, the use of force in CT can lead to a garrison state “in which the 
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in the society,”40F41 as the threat of 
terrorism will enhance the role of security organizations.41F42 The result is often a strong 
executive dominated by the military that is active in both homeland security and outside 
the country’s borders, making it difficult to maintain civilian control. Civil-military 
balance is usually fragile in procedural democracies as political leaders may fear a coup, 
particularly if the military is strong, which limits their bargaining capabilities. The 
military also starts believing in its grandiose self-image as the savior of the nation.42F43 For 
example, in Peru, an overwhelmingly military approach to counterterrorism in the 1980s 
against the Shining Path brought Peru’s fragile democracy to the verge of collapse.43F44 
Alternatively, if political leaders can weaken the military’s political power while 
simultaneously increasing its control over the judiciary and the bureaucracy, civilians’ 
power goes unchecked and the quality of democracy declines. Thus, we suggest that in 
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procedural democracies, military counterterrorism strategies increase military executive 
power, leading to a decline of the quality of democracy (H2).  
 In liberal democracies, civilians may be more eager to use force than their military 
counterparts; or the military may want to use force while civilians object to it. Either way, 
since the civilian control of the military is strong, the bargaining leverage of the political 
elite is higher than the military’s.  Believing the threat is paramount or simply seizing an 
opportunity to increase political power or popularity, the political elite is likely to disregard 
the military’s expertise and isolate it from decision-making in the security sector.44F 45 
Consequently, officers feel that they are not allowed to do their jobs properly and that their 
civilian superiors’ power has gone unchecked. The political elite in European liberal 
democracies such as France, the UK and Germany have bargained with their militaries as 
radical Islamist terrorism surged in the last decade. For example, the French Defense 
Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian argued, “the militarization of terrorism demands a military 
response,” which made European officers rather uneasy about the portrayal of 
counterterrorism as war.45F 46  Therefore, we posit that in liberal democracies, military 
counterterrorism strategies lead to unchecked increase in civilian executive power, which 
inhibits the quality of democracy (H3). 46F47  
 
Research Design 
We operationalize decline in the quality of democracy by tracing the deterioration of civil 
and political liberties, and accountability of executive power. When governments use 
military counterterrorism measures, we expect limitations on political and civil liberties, 
including new punitive anti-terrorism legislations, extensive detention periods, 
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widespread practice of torture, and extensive intelligence gathering and secrecy. These 
changes in democracy happen as CMR shift at the societal and decision-maker levels. At 
the societal level, higher levels of trust in the military (as an institution) and military 
actions (as policy options) would indicate increased societal level trust in the military 
resulting in militarism in procedural and liberal democracies alike. At the decision-maker 
level, in procedural democracies, the military’s increased access to more resources 
through militarization, higher levels of involvement in political decisions, and the 
military’s ability to sideline political elites or dominate the decision-making processes 
would suggest elevated levels of military executive power. In liberal democracies, 
political elite’s eagerness to authorize a military involvement while disregarding military 
expertise in decision-making would point to elevated levels of unchecked civilian 
executive power.   
 
Case Selection 
“Most different systems” is a method of controlled comparison based on the selection of 
cases that have different general characteristics, yet similar values on the key independent 
variable and the dependent variable. 47F48  The idea here is to establish causality between the 
independent and dependent variables by eliminating other general characteristics, such as 
international and socio-economic variables, that might affect the outcome. If, under very 
different circumstances, two cases that have similar values of the key independent 
variable also have the same outcome, then it means that the outcome is a function of the 
key variable that is common to both cases. All the other circumstances that are different 
are irrelevant. A major advantage of the most different systems design is that it allows 
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researchers to draw attention to similar or identical processes across a wide variety of 
cases, thus, expanding or limiting the scope of conditions of established research 
findings.48F49 Following this comparative logic, we use two countries in different stages of 
their democratic development: Turkey, a procedural democracy, and the U.S., a liberal 
democracy. The cases vary in their historical legacy, power status, capability, GDP, 
education, geography, ethnic heterogeneity, and other micro-level socio-economic 
variables that could affect democracy.  
The pairing of Turkey and the U.S. is particularly interesting because the U.S. is a 
“hard” case.49F50 It is a liberal democracy and, hence, should remain more resistant to 
decline in its democracy. If the quality of democracy declines in the U.S., we can 
establish that military CT measures diminish levels of democracy regardless of the type 
of democracy.  Moreover, the 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered a significant threat 
perception in the decision-makers and an almost immediate military CT response.  
We utilize mainly secondary data; however, we also use primary data in the form 
of the first authors’ interviews with civilian and military officials. These two cases help 
eliminate potentially confounding factors and allow us to explore the relationship 
between military counterterrorism measures, CMR and the quality of democracy.50F51  
 
Procedural Democracy: Military Counterterrorism Measures, CMR and 
Democracy in Turkey 
Except for a ceasefire period from 1999-2003, Turkey has dealt with domestic terrorism 
since 1984 when the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) struck civilian and military targets 
in the east of Turkey.51F52 Since the mid-1980s, PKK attacks and the government’s 
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counterterrorism strategy have claimed more than 30,000 lives.52F53 A military CT strategy 
has changed CMR at societal and decision-maker levels and has jeopardized the quality 
of democracy in Turkey since 1980s. Our analysis demonstrates that the implementation 
of military counterterrorism measures in a procedural democracy significantly diminishes 
the quality of democracy. As the Turkish government employed an overwhelmingly 
military strategy to defeat the PKK, the Turkish society settled for reduced levels of civil 
and political rights in exchange for increased security. Concurrently, the political elite 
capitulated by handing over its executive power, particularly in security-related issues, to 
the armed forces because of the military’s history of successful coups. Although 
democracy in Turkey seemed to improve in the 2000s caused by some level of 
normalization of CMR, the executive power of the military particularly in security-related 
issues remains intact.53F54  
 
The societal level 
A military counterterrorism approach to terrorism stalled consolidation of Turkish 
democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Turkey’s polity score dropped 2 points, and Freedom 
House downgraded Turkey’s democracy rating from “free” to “partly free” between 1988 
and 1997.54F55 Since the Turkish government countered terrorism in a military fashion, it 
mainly employed armed operations, followed by punitive anti-terror laws.55F56  
The PKK has been the main terrorist threat to Turkey since 1984.  When the PKK 
first attacked, Turkey was transitioning to democracy after the 1980 coup. Instead of 
opening a public debate on the Kurdish question, Prime Minister Turgut Özal opted for a 
military response. The military was already influential in security issues through its 
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presence in the National Security Council. It did not take long before the government and 
military allied to institutionalize this implicit war, militarizing the nation.  First, a village 
guard system was installed where Kurdish villagers were armed and paid by the state to 
fight against the PKK. Then, emergency rule was established in Kurdish regions, 
significantly curbing civil liberties and freedoms. Examples of the deterioration of human 
rights in the region include disappearances under detention, summary executions, and 
torture and deaths in prisons in the southeast.56F57 The Kurds and the left in Turkey viewed 
these measures as repressive, which also eroded the trust of these segments of the society 
in Turkish democracy.57F58  
In the other segments of the society, trust in the military to provide security 
increased despite the ineffectiveness of the armed counterterrorism strategy to end the 
conflict until 1999. Turkish citizens tolerated militarism and rarely protested the decline 
in civil liberties due to harsh anti-terror laws pushed by the military. According to 
independent surveys, trust for the military in the 1990s never dipped below 90% as 
opposed to around 20% for the parliament. Civilians bargained with the military over the 
use of force and complied with the military’s demands in return for political survival and 
independence in other policy areas such as the economy. 
The Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 of April 12, 1991, which sent thousands of people 
to prison for allegedly being members of a terrorist organization or expressing opinions 
against the state is a good example of how statutes were changed and democracy was 
undermined throughout the 1990s.58F59 Article 1 defined terrorism very broadly,59F60 targeting 
anyone deemed as a threat to the state. Article 8 was used as a legal excuse for 
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censorship.60F61 The law went so far as to imprison not only authors but also publishers of 
books that were claimed to support terrorism.  
After several coalition governments, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 
electoral success in 2002 transformed the political landscape. AKP’s leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan suggested, “the terrorism problem of Turkey can be resolved through a 
democratic opening and a pluralist perspective to mitigate the grievances of all ethnic and 
religious minority groups, including Kurds.”61F62 AKP’s objective of attracting Kurdish 
votes was paired with Turkey’s official candidacy to the EU, which stipulated a 
resolution to the Kurdish issue. Switching from a military counterterrorism strategy to a 
conciliatory approach, negotiations between the government and the PKK raised little 
reaction from the officers. A series of laws and regulations, intended to harmonize the 
Turkish government’s relations with the Kurds, were passed through the 2000s.  
AKP’s initial conciliatory approach to the Kurdish issue led to improvements in 
political and civil liberties, indicating an increase in the quality of democracy. Several 
legal measures facilitated democratization: In 2002, three sets of laws altered Article 312 
allowing for speeches that did not entail violence and lifting the ban on the use of the 
Kurdish language. In 2003, the fifth and sixth sets of measures allowed re-prosecution of 
some trials and repealed Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law of 1991 and narrowed the 
definition of terrorism. The seventh one altered Article 159 of the Penal Code allowing 
for shorter sentences for people who insult Turkishness and the Republic, which was used 
for prosecuting writers, journalists and academics.  Finally, in 2004, the eighth set of laws 
and regulations abolished the death penalty, directly benefiting Abdullah Öcalan, the 
founding leader of PKK who was captured in 1999.62F63   
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As CMR got less strained during the ceasefire, ensuing PKK terrorism after 2003 
intimidated the government and was once again followed by a military CT response and a 
decline in civil liberties. For instance, in 2006, the anti-terror law was amended to 
broaden its applicability and the new Penal Code of 2005 “fell short of expectations: 
restrictions on freedom of expression remained, and crimes deemed terrorist offenses 
were vaguely worded and lacked the clarity required in criminal law.”63F64 The government 
claimed the presence of a coup-plotting secularist military terrorist organization 
(Ergenekon) backed by civilians, leading to very long detention periods and deteriorating 
the quality of democracy. Nonetheless, the official ceasefire in 1999-2003, and the slow 
pace of attacks until 2011 (less than 30 in most years) enabled the AKP to argue that the 
military was no longer the only viable option in combating terrorism. The 2011 World 
Values Survey shows that trust for the military dropped to a historic low of 76% and trust 
in the government increased to 62%.64F65  
Yet, the democratic culture still suffers from the military’s lingering political 
influence. Civilians do not express sufficient interest in defense-related issues.65F66 Sarigil 
and Gursoy’s survey indicates that the society remains militaristic.66F67 Segments of society 
often call for military’s help against the governing AKP, and Kurds still have low levels 
of trust in domestic institutions, including the military.67F68 The rekindling of the Kurdish 
issue and the collapse of the negotiations between the government and the Kurdish 
political elite in July 2015 led, once again, to military counterterrorism measures.68F69 The 
imposition of round-the-clock curfews and armed responses to protests in the southeast in 
2015 jeopardized democracy.69F70 
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The decision-maker level 
The military CT approach the Turkish government implemented since the mid-
1980s has also affected CMR at the decision-maker level.  The relationship between the 
military and the political elite changed as the military’s executive power increased 
significantly.  
The military has traditionally enjoyed public support as it intervened in politics in 
1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 to guard the secular nature of democracy.70F71 The political 
leaders had long known that they had to operate within secular boundaries clearly defined 
by the military.71F72 Given militarism and increased trust in the military, the political elite 
generally accepted an increase in the military’s executive power without challenging the 
military’s role.     
As the PKK-related death toll peaked in the mid-1990s72F73 the government 
funneled more resources to the military, increasing its defense spending from 2.94% of 
GDP to 3.53% in two years.73F74 Yet, this surging militarization was ineffective and 
terrorist attacks increased from 19 in 1984 to 42 in 1988 and 193 in 1990.74F75  
By the 1990s, the military started operations after procuring weapons from the 
U.S. and austere training to fight in the mountains.75F76 As the accounts of the retired 
generals who fought against the PKK demonstrate, the military was given the 
wherewithal to fight terrorism.76F77  
Although the armed forces have always been a powerful actor until the 1990s, one 
exception to contest its power on security was the then President Özal’s confrontation 
with his Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay. Özal wanted to resolve PKK terrorism 
through a “carrots and stick” policy.  Before the Gulf War in 1990, Özal intended to join 
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the coalition powers. However, General Torumtay believed that an Iraqi war would 
weaken the borders and strengthen the PKK.77F78 The crisis entailed the resignation of 
General Torumtay while Operation Comfort indeed provided a safe haven for the PKK. 
The number of attacks surged from 295 in 1991 to 515 in 1992, increasing the military’s 
distrust of civilians despite the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire offer in 1993. The day after the 
ceasefire offer, Özal died of a heart attack, which was also a couple weeks after 
advocating for cultural rights for Kurds and the solution of a federation.  
Özal’s death culminated in a period of submissive politicians and stronger 
military tutelage where the military’s executive power increased until Erdoğan came to 
power.  Prime Minister Tansu Çiller was particularly cooperative with the military’s 
policies; “US$8 billion was spent on military operations in the southeast, at the same time 
that more moderate Kurdish representatives were banished from Ankara’s National 
Assembly.”78F79 She was on good terms with the generals until coalescing with the Islamist 
Welfare Party (Refah) in 1996. Çiller’s partnership with Refah violated the long-
established boundaries on secularism. On February 28, 1997, the military issued a harsh 
warning to the government against rising internal threats, including Islamism. Due to the 
pressure of the military, backed up by civil society organizations’ calls for military 
intervention, Refah’s leader Necmettin Erbakan, in apprehension of a coup, resigned from 
the coalition government.  President Süleyman Demirel, who previously lost his seat in 
two coups in 1971 and 1980, was supportive of the military contending, “Civilians did 
not have the luxury to make the kind of mistakes that Refah did.”79F80 Thereafter, civilians 
continued to leave all security-related matters to the military until Öcalan’s capture in 
1999.  
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While the ceasefire and EU reforms gave a breathing space to CMR until 2003, 
Erdoğan was far from achieving civilian control. In fact, on April 27, 2007, the military 
published a warning to the government and opposed AKP’s candidate for presidency. 
Sarigil argues, Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug and Isik Kosaner revealed the military’s 
historical stance as guardians of the nation between 2008-12.80F81  
In July 2016, a group of military officers staged a coup against the AKP 
government, which failed as thousands of civilians took to the streets to neutralize the 
security forces. Consequently, President Erdogan not only purged 1,648 ranking officers, 
but he also initiated extensive reforms in Turkey’s security sector.81F82 Yet, the coup failed 
to tip the balance of power in favor of civilians, particularly in the fight against PKK. 
Although as Gurcan and Gisclon note, the coup plotters “have broken the ivory tower in 
which the military once sat” and triggered an unprecedented rapprochement and military 
reforms favoring the civilian government in CMR,82F83 the military still has a major 
influence in CT.  For instance, after the coup attempt and the subsequent purges, the 
Chief of Staff General Hulusi Akar stated that he would work with President Erdogan to 
continue to combat PKK terrorism.  Moreover, the initial civilianization process after the 
failed coup came to a halt as attacks from Kurdish and Islamic State militants increased 
in late 2016. President Erdogan has formed alliances with the secular wing of the military 
because he did not trust the new and less professional recruits that have replaced the 
purged ones. Nonetheless, the implications of this new alignment between the 
government and the Turkish Armed Forces for future civil-military relations are still 
unclear. What is clear, however, is that the executive in Turkey appears ever more 
aggressive and unconstrained in its use of force in counterterrorism.83F84    
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Liberal Democracy: Military Counterterrorism Measures, CMR and Democracy in 
the United States 
9/11 attacks were the largest scale terrorist attacks on the US.  While the U.S. previously 
responded to terrorist attacks within the criminal justice system, the Bush administration 
implemented a military counterterrorism strategy following the 9/11 attacks and named 
this strategy the “War on Terror” (WOT). During his September 20, 2001 speech to the 
Joint Session of Congress, George W. Bush stated: 
“On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years, they have been 
wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the 
casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. 
Americans have known surprise attacks but never before on thousands of 
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a 
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”84F85  
 
 The Bush administration presented the terrorist attack as “an act of war” and 
instilled the idea of global terrorism as an existential threat to the U.S., which required 
emergency measures, such as preventive wars in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Desch 
contends that the Bush administration’s military counterterrorism response has “sparked 
more civil-military conflict on the home front than we’ve seen since the Vietnam War.”85F86 
While the US military itself did not see the threat as existential, that hardly mattered to a 
government that was determined to prove the country was in war.86F87  
 
The societal level 
After the implementation of a military response, the effects of the WOT permeated all 
levels of society. For example, although the war in Iraq triggered public outrage when 
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weapons of mass destruction were not found and casualties escalated, the U.S. presence 
in Afghanistan hardly elicited similar protests. A 2011 Gallup survey shows that 
“Americans continue to express greater confidence in the military than in 15 other 
national institutions” with 78% showing a “great deal” of confidence compared to 12% 
for the Congress.87F88 Trust in the federal government has been on the decline while trust in 
the military has surged over the last thirty-five years.88F89   
The growing reliance on the U.S. military power and the glorification of the 
military at the societal level had negative consequences for democracy.89F90 The “Patriot 
Act” (PA) of 2001 and amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and the Protect 
America Act of 2007 indicate that the U.S. passed several laws that curtailed the civil 
rights of citizens and immigrants. The PA curbed democracy through “enhanced 
surveillance, information sharing and indefinite detention.”90F91 According to Large, “The 
Patriot Act in the USA has suspended rights and civil liberties in a manner unprecedented 
since the Civil War, with judicial rulings that components are unconstitutional, for 
example, the provision allowing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to demand 
information from Internet service providers without judicial oversight or public 
review.”91F92 Together with the restrictions on the Freedom of Information Act, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has found the PA to be in violation of the first, 
third, fourth and fifth amendments, and combatted vehemently to end the large scale 
monitoring and surveillance programs by filing a lawsuit against the PA in June 2003.92F93 
The Bush administration “has fought attempts by the ACLU to force the Justice 
Department to disclose how often it has used its expanded authority under the Patriot 
Act.”93F94 In 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
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capture content from foreign wire communications without a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant, which later became known as the President’s 
Surveillance Program and created controversy when it became public.94F95  
PRISM is another secret surveillance program initiated in 2007 storing Internet 
communications requested from companies such as Google under the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008. The Obama administration took heat from Edward Snowden’s disclosure of 
this mass collection of citizens’ phone records and the attempts to cover PRISM 
compliance costs resulted in millions paid to Internet companies.95F96 Despite protests from 
representatives, the amendment to the bill proposing to limit PRISM was defeated in the 
House,96F97 followed by Republicans successfully blocking a vote in the Senate.97F98         
While these laws led to a decline in civil liberties, those that were drafted but not 
passed also reveal problems for U.S. democracy. These draft bills help measure the 
second element of democracy used to show how the ambitions of the executive could 
jeopardize democracy if unchecked.  For example, the Domestic Security Enhancement 
Act of 2003, also known as the Second Patriot Act and drafted by the Department of 
Justice overturned the rule of “getting court approval before conducting wiretapping, 
searches or surveillance for national security purposes.” Although this act was not passed, 
the PRISM program shows that the mentality remained and was put in practice without 
the consent of Congress.  
The Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) program was another 
attempt at improper surveillance. Under TIPS, workers and government employees who 
had access to private homes would report suspicious activities. Goldstein, who first 
revealed the program to the media argued that, upon implementation of the TIPS 
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program, “the U.S. will have a higher percentage of citizen informants than the former 
East Germany through the infamous Stasi secret police.”98F99 Despite supporters in the 
Senate, the program was prohibited in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  In 2002, 
under retired Navy Admiral John Poindexter, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) established the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program to launch 
a surveillance and information technology system to track terrorists.99F100 Congress cut the 
Office’s funding in 2003 following media critiques of TIA. 
In sum, the implementation of a military counterterrorism strategy affected the 
quality of American democracy negatively by altering the CMR at the societal level since 
9/11.  Even though some of the most controversial intelligence practices that were 
implemented after 9/11 including extraordinary rendition, enhanced interrogation, and the 
TIA, were dropped due to public opposition, in early 2018, the Trump Administration 
extended the government’s surveillance powers (Section 702 of the Foreign Surveillance 
Act). 100F101 While democratic decline at the societal level happened neither in a linear way 
nor across all segments of the society as demonstrated by the ACLU’s outspoken and 
legal resistance to the PA or the media criticisms of the TIA, the CMR has been 
instrumental in the overall trajectory of democratic decline since 9/11.  
 
The decision-maker level 
The Bush administration’s military CT approach after 9/11 has hurt the quality of 
democracy by shifting the balance toward the political elites in the CMR context. 
Scholars have noted that since the end of the Cold War, CMR in the U.S. has been 
strained.101F102 Accordingly, CMR was marked by a decline in civilian control in the post-
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Cold War era.102F103 Strained CMR were apparent when the military got outspokenly critical 
of the Clinton administration.103F104 The military began challenging civilian decisions, which 
led to a weakening of military professionalism.104F105 After 9/11, the WOT helped civilians 
use the terrorist threat to alter CMR and dominate the bargaining dynamics with the 
military.    
Brooks suggests that civilians have been contemplating a new role for the military 
“as a participant in safeguarding U.S. domestic security” to protect Americans from each 
other and homegrown terrorists.105F106 This new role would change the armed forces’ 
purpose and culture and the ways it relates to society. Moreover, the increased use of the 
military for homeland security and deployment of troops abroad increased the number of 
U.S. citizens fighting in the WOT.106F107  
Although the issue of the use of force often strained CMR as in the Madeleine 
Albright/Colin Powell altercation on “what to do with all the military power U.S. has if 
it’s not going to use it,”107F108 the military generally remained subordinate to the detriment 
of useful military advice.  For example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were at odds over national security policy, drawing the Congress 
into the conflict.108F109 When Donald Rumsfeld disliked the advice he received about the 
WOT, he ignored military expertise.109F110 While this was perhaps due to Rumsfeld’s 
personality and/or ideology, the WOT was the catalyst. Consequently, officers have 
become politicized as they lobbied Congress on several occasions, creating tension 
between legislators and the executive branch.110F111 Strained pre-9/11 relations further 
deteriorated during the Bush administration, and failed to recover fully as the Obama 
administration remained dismissive of the military’s critiques. Since the forced 
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resignation of General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military commander in 
Afghanistan, the military has remained suspicious of civilians who had little trust for the 
armed forces.111F112  
Moreover, military advice and criticism were often sidelined as the executive 
single-handedly initiated institutional rearrangements to deploy the military. For 
example, the administration created new governmental departments, increased funding 
for terror-related research, and granted the military and intelligence agencies vast powers 
for detention, interrogation, and surveillance.112F113  
 This weakening of the line between the military’s use in external defense and 
homeland security deflates the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which aims to prevent the 
federal government’s use of the military to reestablish security inside the states. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established in 2002 with 
the objective of supporting civilian authorities in their CT efforts. The National Security 
Emergency Preparedness Directorate (NSEP) is expected to take charge in case of an 
emergency (i.e., a large-scale terrorist attack). The Directorate coordinates Defense 
Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA), where federal agencies use the military for acts 
otherwise undertaken by civilians, including law enforcement and disaster relief.113F114  
While the DSCA may be appropriate for natural disasters, its use in CT efforts is 
controversial.114F115   
Another major change in CMR that affected democracy was the decline of the 
executive branch’s accountability. The Warner Amendment (or Section 1076 of the 2007 
Defense Authorization Bill) increased the President’s ability to use the military for 
homeland defense, giving him the ability to issue executive orders without securing the 
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approval of the Congress.115F116 The harsh anti-terror laws authorized by the Bush 
administration that led to poor detention practices and the use of torture for intelligence 
purposes are prime examples of the negative democratic consequences of a lack of 
executive accountability.  According to Ignatieff, several Supreme Court justices (i.e. 
Stephen Breyer) are not happy with how constitutional checks on executive power have 
failed to work since WOT.116F117  The situation hardly improved under the Obama 
administration as the former President admitted in the wake of the 2013 NSA scandal.117F118  
The decline in civil liberties and rise of executive power in the U.S. is further 
illustrated in detention laws and practice.  It is a clear democratic principle that no one 
should be held in detention indefinitely without access to public review and trial by jury. 
To get around this principle, the Bush Administration declared that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to WOT.118F119 Al Qaeda and Taliban convicts are not considered 
prisoners of war, and therefore, are not subject to the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions.  This decision and has raised objections by the military, especially the 
Judge Advocate General (JAG), causing civil-military tension.119F120 Since 2002, the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has detained individuals indefinitely while the Justice 
Department argued Guantanamo was outside its legal jurisdiction.  
After 9/11, civilians have been tried in military courts, a U.S. practice that 
resembles the trial of civilians in Turkish military courts. Supreme Court decisions since 
2004 have criticized this practice. Several acts were passed to solve the jurisdictional 
problems, such as the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 and 2009, and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, which dealt with 
controversial cases such as Hamden v. Rumsfeld.  In Boumediene v. Bush (2008), the 
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Supreme Court ruled that detainees have the right to trial in civil federal courts; however, 
Guantanamo detainees remain in prisons and are still tried in military courts.  
Finally, Guantanamo detainees have been tortured to gather intelligence. Judge 
Susan Crawford appointed by the Bush administration found that the military tortured a 
Saudi national suspected for involvement in September 11 attacks, “interrogating him 
with techniques that included sustained isolation, sleep deprivation, nudity and prolonged 
exposure to cold.”120F121 The CIA ran secret prisons outside U.S. borders and Rumsfeld 
“authorized the military to replace traditional interrogation techniques with harsher so-
called enhanced interrogation techniques.”121F122 In 2002, the FBI was concerned about 
harsh military techniques and argued that the use of torture not only led to an institutional 
clash between conventional and non-conventional agencies of the state, but also 
jeopardized civil society and its trust in the government’s acts.122F123 
Overall, WOT in the U.S. has tipped civil-military balance by the political elite’s 
excessive use of military force, leading to diminished civil liberties and checks on 
civilian executive power. However, due to the ingrained democratic culture of a liberal 
democracy, which was institutionalized in the United States via the Constitution, the 
Insurrection Act of 1807 and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,123F124 the fragile civilian-
military balance did not result in a complete deterioration of democracy as in the case of 
Turkey.  The inclusion of former military generals in the Trump administration, namely 
the White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly, the Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, and the 
National Security Adviser H.R McMaster, and their increased influence over President 
Trump,124F125 however, suggests a heavier reliance on military responses to terrorism.  
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Conclusion  
The empirical evidence supports our main argument that the extensive use of a 
military counterterrorism approach jeopardizes the quality of democracy in procedural 
and liberal democracies alike by altering civil-military dynamics. At the societal level, a 
military CT response to terrorist threats signals to the public that the country is at war and 
that the military is the most suitable institution to deal with the challenge. As this belief 
increases the trust of the society in the military, militaristic values creep into all walks of 
life, from the entertainment industry to think tanks or universities. The use of force is 
justified as threat perception increases. At the decision-maker level, the civil-military 
bargaining structure changes in a militarized environment where the use of force is 
normalized and defense budgets. In Turkey, at the societal level, the military CT 
approach increased the society’s trust in the military and spread militaristic values as the 
public internalized harsh counterterrorism measures as part of life. At the decision-maker 
level, overwhelming terrorist attacks curbed the civilian political elite’s resolve to stand 
up to the Turkish military, which had a long history of coups and behind-the-scenes 
intervention in politics. Dominance of military CT measures strengthened the military’s 
hand in politics, and civil-military bargaining fueled militarization through increased 
defense spending. As a procedural democracy, Turkey was unable to prevent the decline 
in civil liberties and rise in military executive power due to military CT measures and the 
excessive use of force in response to terrorism.   
The U.S. case shows that liberal democracies are not immune to the ill effects of 
military counterterrorism responses.  In the U.S., at the societal level, the military CT 
approach increased the society’s trust in the military to unprecedented levels, and 
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instilled militaristic values as the public and the government internalized harsh 
counterterrorism measures as a necessary evil. At the decision-maker level, civil-military 
bargaining caused tension resulting in disregard of military expertise and politicization of 
the American military.    
In both cases, the changing dynamics due to military CT measures impacted 
democracy adversely in two measurable ways: a decline in civil liberties and a rise in 
executive power. As the executive relies more on a military approach to counterterrorism, 
the military is over-used, the society tends to normalize the military’s overwhelming 
involvement in security, anti-terror laws get harsher, detentions lengthen without public 
review, secret surveillance spreads, civilians are tried in military courts, and torture 
becomes a legitimate means to gather intelligence. This is how the military gained the 
upper hand in the executive in Turkey until the mid-2000s, and still does in security-
related policy-making i.e. the Kurdish conflict. In the U.S., civilians in the executive 
branch dominated the military, straining CMR at times due to disagreement on the extent 
of use of force. Although the U.S. remained more democratic than Turkey because of its 
deeply rooted democratic tradition and established laws, the quality of democracy in both 
cases diminished due to military CT measures and the excessive use of force.   
Both countries have employed multiple CT approaches and tried to improve their 
criminal justice responses to terrorism. Turkey offered pardons to terrorists; however, 
laws remained punitive. In the U.S., several states passed anti-terrorism legislation that 
assigned a significant role to prosecutors to investigate and prosecute terrorists and 
cooperate with intelligence agencies.125F126 These efforts, however, have not prevented shifts 
in CMR and failed in Turkey and remained limited in the U.S. case.       
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In sum, a military CT approach has not obliterated terrorism in either case. 
Clearly, “some amount of terrorism is likely to be part of life for the foreseeable 
future.”126F127 A combination of military and other approaches to counterterrorism fare better 
than any single-handed approach.127F128 Thus, future scholarship should tackle how other 
approaches work to instill healthy CMR and strong democracies, where civil liberties are 
protected and the executive is sufficiently constrained or at least mitigate the ill effects. 
Finally, an extension of the argument of this study to European cases may be the next 
step for a better understanding of the relationship between military counterterrorism 
measures, civil-military relations and democracy.      
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Figure 1. Causal Mechanisms for Military Counterterrorism Measures in 
Democracies 
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